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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD
COUNCIL INC., A Nonprofit
Corporation AND
KEITH AND DEBBIE WIDDISON,

;
i
]

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
vs.
i
i

JOHN PURDUE,
De fendant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 910206
Priority No. 16

;

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

Beth Purdue's motion to set aside the default judgment granted
against John Purdue.

Rulings on a motion for relief from a

judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting

Beth Purdue and Capitol Hill's motions to correct clerical
errors.

Orders to correct clerical errors are reviewed under an

abuse of discretion standard.
1312 (Utah App. 1991).

State of Utah v. Moya, 815 P.2d

CONTROLLING RULES
See addendum for complete text of Rule 60, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellees Capitol Hill Neighborhood Council, Inc.
and Keith and Debbie Widdison ("Capitol Hill") brought this
action for damages and injunctive relief to abate a nuisance, an
abandoned building known as Bob's Motel Annex, being maintained
on de fendant John Purdue's (MPurdue") property.[R•2-17]

Purdue

answered the complaint, admitted ownership of the property, but
denied it was a nuisance.[R.19-31]

Purdue attended a pretrial

conference on November 14, 1990.[R.44-47]

Purdue then failed to

appear at the final pretrial conference which had been properly
scheduled and noticed for January 3, 1991.[R.46-47]

On January

31, 1991, a default judgment was entered against Purdue for his
failure to appear.

The default judgment mistakenly named Beth

Purdue as a co-defendant.[R.48, 58-64]

On February 5, 1991, Beth

Purdue filed a motion to remove herself from the default judgment
and to set aside the judgment against John Purdue.[R.65-68]

On

April 11, 1991, Capitol Hill filed a motion to correct clerical
errors, namely the erroneous addition of Beth Purdue as a
defendant and the incomplete description of the property at
2

issue, pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.[R.71-73]

At a hearing on April 22, 1991, Capitol

Hill's motion was granted and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment were amended to remove all references to Beth
Purdue and to clarify the address of the property at issue.[R.74]
Beth Purdue's motion to remove her name from the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment was granted.

Her motion

for a new trial and to set aside the judgment against John Purdue
was denied.
John and Beth Purdue filed a notice of appeal on April 29,
1991, from the District Court's bench ruling of April 22,
1991.[R.80-81]

The order formalizing this bench ruling was

entered on May 15, 1991.[R.87-88]
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
John Purdue is the owner of Bob's Motel Annex in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

The Annex is located at the rear of a lot at 534

North 300 West and is adjacent to Artie Court.

This building is

deteriorated and dangerous in the following respects:
a.

the building was vacant, open and unsecured, and is

now abandoned and boarded;
b.

the building is a harbor for vagrants and vandals;

c.

the building is in violation of various building
3

codes.
On March 30, 1989, the Salt Lake Department of Building and
Housing Services issued a Notice and Order to John Purdue.

The

Notice and Order stated that the building was substandard and
dangerous, and declared the building a public nuisance requiring
abatement by repair or demolition.

The Notice and Order further

declared that this vacant abandoned structure constituted an
attractive nuisance and served as a blight and a danger to the
neighborhood, in violation of Section 202 of the Uniform Housing
Code, and Section 302 of the Uniform Code for the Abatement of
Dangerous Buildings, both adopted by Salt Lake City in Salt Lake
City Ordinance §18.48.010.

John Purdue failed to obey the Notice

and Order and neither repaired nor demolished the building in
question.
Widdisons are adjacent property owners.

Capitol Hill

Neighborhood Council Inc. is a non-profit corporation concerned
about the quality of life in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of
Salt Lake City.

Capitol Hill and Widdisons sought an order of

the court requiring the demolition of Bob's Motel Annex and/or
money damages for the nuisance it presented to the neighborhood.
The default judgment of January 31, 1991, ordered the demolition
of the Annex. [R.78]
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Beth Purdue's motion to set aside the default judgment granted
against John Purdue.

Beth Purdue's attempts at intervention were

untimely and without merit except to delete her as an erroneously
named defendant.
2.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

Capitol Hill and Beth Purdue's motions to correct clerical errors
in the original judgment.

The changes corrected the improper

addition of Beth Purdue as a defendant and clarified the location
of the building in question.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
BETH PURDUE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AND TO "INTERVENE"
A.

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED
AGAINST JOHN PURDUE

A default judgment was entered against John and Beth Purdue
on January 31, 1991. Beth Purdue, John Purdue's wife, filed a
motion to set that judgment aside on February 5, 1991.[R.65-68]
The proper standard of review for such motions is an abuse of
discretion standard.

"The trial court is afforded broad

discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment. . .
5

and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion."

Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989).

Beth Purdue filed her motion to set aside the default
judgment on the ground that she was named as a defendant in the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and the Notice
of Judgment, but had not been named in or served with the
original complaint.

Beth Purdue was correct in that she was not

a party to the lawsuit and should not have been included in the
judgment.

This error was conceded by Capitol Hill and was the

basis for its Rule 60(a) motion.

This motion, which concurred

with part of Beth Purdue's motion, was granted.

The other

aspects of Beth Purdue's motion, to set aside the default
judgment against John Purdue or for a new trial, were denied.
Other than the part of the motion concerning her improper
inclusion, her motion was apparently an attempted intervention in
this suit.
A trial court has the authority to grant a default judgment
as a sanction for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference.
Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
sanctions as provided in Rule 37, U. R. Civ. P., for failure to
appear at a scheduling or pretrial conference. Rule 16(d) states

6

If a party or a party's attorney fails to
obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a
scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party
or a party's attorney is substantially
unprepared to participate in the conference,
or if a party or a party's attorney fails to
participate in good faith, the court, upon
motion or its own initiative, may make such
orders with regard thereto as are just, and
among others, any of the orders provided in
Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D)(emphasis added).
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that "an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against the disobedient party;M are proper sanctions
(emphasis added).
The standard for a review of sanctions imposed for failure
to appear is an abuse of discretion standard.

See, Schoney v.

Memorial Estates, 790 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1990) (Trial court did
not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment as a
sanction for failure to fulfill discovery obligations).
In W.W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc.,
568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court of Utah stated
that "[u]nder Rule 37(d) sanctions are justified without
reference to whether the unexcused failure to make discovery was

7

willful.

The sanction of default judgment is justified where

there has been a frustration of the judicial procedure, ...."
See also, Darrinoton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991) and
Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah
App. 1989).
Because Rule 16(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerning
sanctions contains the exact text of Rule 16(F) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal case law is useful.

As is true

under the Utah rule, the federal rule allows the court, upon
motion or on its own initiative, to enter an order of default
judgment when a party or their attorney fails to appear at a
scheduled conference or hearing.
For example, a United States Bankruptcy Court in In Re
McDowell, 33 BR 323 (ND Ohio 1983), affirmed an order of default
judgment as a sanction for failure to appear at a duly scheduled
pre-trial conference.
Other state courts have reached similar conclusions.

In

Beal v. Rent-A-Center of America, 771 P.2d 553, 555 (Kansas App.
1989), the court stated that "although dismissal is a severe and
harsh action, it remains a very effective method of maintaining
docket control and serves as a reminder that . . . pretrial
conferences cannot be ignored with impunity."
8

In Beal, the

court held that the trial court had the authority to dismiss the
action where the plaintiff refused to answer interrogatories and
to attend a pretrial conference.
In the present case, the trial court was within its
authority in granting a default judgment after Purdue was
notified of the January 3, 1991, pretrial and failed to appear.
[R.46-7]

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allow such a

remedy.
B.

BETH PURDUE'S "MOTION TO INTERVENE" WAS PROPERLY DENIED

Beth Purdue first asserted an interest in this proceeding as a
part of her motion filed on February 5, 1991. This motion was
granted in part and denied in part and resulted in the
corrections of clerical errors which relieved her of any
liability and in effect granted her motion to set aside the
default judgment as to her.

In other respects, asking the trial

court to set aside the default judgment as to her husband or
asking for a new trial was essentially a motion to intervene.
This attempt to intervene and obtain additional relief was
untimely and improper.
The right to intervene under Rule 24(a), U. R. Civ. P. is
not absolute, but is subject to the requirement that the
application for intervention be timely.
9

Jenner v. Real Estate

Services, 659 P.2d 1072, 1073, 1074 (Utah 1983).

Intervention is

not permitted after entry of judgment unless there is a strong
showing of entitlement and such unusual or compelling
circumstances as will justify failure to intervene earlier.

The

timeliness of the application should be determined under the
facts and circumstances of each particular case, and is in the
sound discretion of the court."

Republic Ins. Group v. Doman,

774 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989) citing Jenner, 659 P.2d 1072,
1073-74.

See also. Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson, 797

P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990).
In Jenner, the Utah Supreme Court denied a real estate
partner's motion to intervene filed eleven days after entry of a
default judgment.

The court held the intervener had no standing

to assert his interest because:

(1) he had chosen to remain

undisclosed as a partner; (2) he had permitted his partner to
assume a role of sole owner of their interest in the property;
and (3) notice of the suit to the defendant operated as notice to
the partnership and the intervener. Id. at 1074.

In this case,

Beth Purdue did not attempt to intervene until after the entry of
the default judgment.

The same analysis should result in denial

of her motions.
John Purdue, in Paragraph 3 of his Answer to Amended
10

Complaint, stated that he was the owner of Bob's Motel Annex at
535 North Arctic Court. [R.20-21] And at no time during
discovery did John Purdue or Beth Purdue make any claim as to her
alleged interest in the property.

She therefore lacks standing

to assert her interest after entry of the default judgment.
Even if Beth Purdue had asserted a right to intervention in
a timely manner the motion would have properly been denied as she
has no interest in the subject property.

Throughout this suit,

the subject property has been referred to as Bob's Motel Annex.
Admittedly, there has been some confusion as to the exact mailing
address.

But there has been no doubt as to which structure is

and has been the subject of this suit, ie; Bob's Motel Annex.
That building is owned solely by John Purdue, as he has admitted.
Beth Purdue does not have a "marital" interest in the
subject property.

In 1975 the Utah Legislature abolished the

estates of dower and curtsey as part of Utah's adoption of the
Uniform Probate Code.

Utah Code § 75-2-113.

In its place, the

Legislature enacted Utah Code § 75-2-201 and 202 which provide a
surviving spouse with a 1/3 elective share of the deceased's
augmented estate.

Since the elective share is limited to

property owned at the time of the spouse's death, it does not
create an inchoate property interest similar to the common law
11

dower interest.

25 Am. Jur. 2d Dower and Curtsey § 40 (1966).

The surviving spouse receives his or her share similar to an
intestate distributee, unlike the dower interest where the widow
took not as an heir, but in her own right.

In re Bullen's

Estate. 152 P. 533, 535 (Utah 1915). The trial court properly
denied any intervention in this suit on the part of Beth Purdue,
other than removing her as an improperly named defendant.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS IN THE FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND NOTICE OF
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the
correction of clerical errors in judgments or orders upon motion
by a party or by the court.

In this case the Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment
were incorrect in that Beth Purdue was inadvertently included in
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Notice of
Entry of Judgment.

The corrections made through the Rule 60(a)

motion related to the removal of Beth Purdue's name and
subsequent number and gender changes and clarifications of the
exact location of the building in question.

These corrections

were purely clerical in nature and have no bearing on the merits
of this case, or this appeal.

The Utah Court of Appeals in State
12

of Utah v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Utah App. 1991)

stated

that Rule 60(a) orders are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.
This Court has stated, quoting Corpus Juris, that a clerical
error "exists when without evident intention one word is written
for another, . . . or when there are mistakes in proper names or
amounts made in copying but which do not change the general sense
of a record:".

Frost v. District Court of First Judicial

District In and For Box Elder County, 83 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah
1938)(emphasis added).

More recently this Court held that "[a]

clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results
in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual
intention of the court.

On the other hand, a judicial error is

one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively
incorrect judgment."

Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Com'n., 770

P.2d 125 (Utah 1989). In the present case, the trial court
entered a default judgment against John Purdue.

Through a

mistake, Beth Purdue was named in the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment.
This error was corrected after Beth Purdue drew this to the
Court's attention and was concurred in by Capitol Hill's Rule
60(a) motion.

This was a mistake in proper names, a clerical
13

error that had no bearing on the court's intention: to order the
demolition of Bob's Motel Annex.

The only other correction that

was made related to the clarification of the address of the
property in question, Bob's Motel Annex.

As noted above, both

the original and the amended judgment related to the same
building.

There was no change of substance at issue in the Rule

60(a) motion, therefore the trial court was within its discretion
in granting that motion.
CONCLUSION
The order of the trial court correcting but refusing to set
aside the default judgment should be upheld.

The court was

within its discretion in granting the judgment as a sanction for
failure to appear, and in denying Beth Purdue's subsequent
challenges to that judgment.

The court acted properly in

striking Beth Purdue from the judgment and in not allowing Beth
Purdue to intervene in this suit through her motion to set aside
as she has no ownership interest in the property in questionr and
even if she did, she did not file for intervention in a timely
manner.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

14

DATED t h i s

~if4r~

day o f

1992.

Respectfully Submitted,
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to: John Purdue, Appellant,
1177 East JSputh Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 on this ^ > ^
day of
, 1992, postage prepaid.
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(a: and c: purdue.brf [em92])
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders- During the pendency of an
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court
Co) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen*
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment 3hall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891

MAY 1 5 1991
JBALT/LAKfc CUUNT V /
Doputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAPITOL HILL NEIGHBORHOOD
COMMUNITY COUNCIL, INC.,
a non-profit
corporation, and KEITH &
DEBBIE WIDDISON,

ORDER
*

Plaintiffs,

it
it
it

VSe

Civil No. 890902814 PR

it

JOHN PURDUE,

it

Judge Michael Murphy

it

Defendant.

it
it

Plaintiffs' Motion to Correct Clerical Errors and Omissions
and Beth Purdue's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion for a New
Trial came on for hearing on April 22, 1991 before the Honorable
Michael Murphy, judge of the above court.

Plaintiffs were

represented by Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc. Defendant
was present and represented himself. The court heard argument
from plaintiffs' counsel, from defendant and from Beth Purdue who
appeared and represented herself. The court reviewed the file in
this matter and now enters the following

!>000^7

ORDER
1. Beth Purdue is not a party to this action. Her motion to
set aside the default judgment entered January 31, 1991 against
both Defendant John Purdue and against her as to her is granted
to the extent that she is improperly named as a party to the
proceedings. Her name shall be removed from all pleadings. As she
is not a party, in all other respects the motion is denied.
2. Plaintiff's motion is granted. The court will sign and
enter the proposed Amended Default Certificate, Amended Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Judgment removing Beth
Purdue's name from the pleadings and making other technical and
clerical corrections. To avoid any possible prejudice to Mrs.
Purdue, these documents will be dated as of January 31, 1991, the
date of entry of the original Default Certificate, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Judgment.
DATED this

A5 ^

day of

T^yjjLy

, 1991.

—77=
MICHAEL MURPI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order to: John and Beth Purdue, 1177 East South
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and to Box R, Sterling, UT
84665, on this '^ day of
of
^f/flfijj
"WMM
r «91»
postage prepaid.
f~i

$#A//fast-

ifn^t

A:PURDUE.ORD RH

;

*:w*«38

